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Abstract
Because of the revolution and the success of the technique IBE (Identification Based Encryption)
in the recent years. The need is growing to have a standardization to this technology to
streamline communication based on it. But this requires a thorough study to extract the strength
and weakness of the most recognized cryptosystems. Our first goal in this work is to approach to
this standardization, by applying a study which permit to extract the best cryptosystems.
As we will see in this work and as Boneh and Boyen said in 2011 (Journal of Cryptology) the BB1
and BB2 are the most efficient schemes in the model selective ID and without random oracle
(they are the only schemes traced in this model). This is right as those schemes are secure (under
this model), efficient and useful for some applications. Our second goal behind this work is to
make an approvement in BB2 to admit a more efficient schemes. We will study the security of our
schemes, which is basing on an efficient strong Diffie-Hellman problem compared to BB1 and
BB2. More than that our HIBE support s+ID-HIBE compared to BBG (Boneh Boyen Goh).
Additionally the ID in our scheme will be in Zp instead of Zp
∗ as with BBG. We will cite more
clearly all these statements in in this article.
keywords
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1 INTRODUCTION
IBE was proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984 [1] as a solution to the problem of the revocation of the
public key and the requirement of the certificate in PKI. In IBE (Identification-Based Encryption)
the public key can be represented as an arbitrary string such as an email address. It’s corresponding
private key is generated by a Private Key Generator (PKG) who authenticate users according to
their corresponding identities. This idea was proposed by Shamir only as concept. And we will wait
until 2001 at which Dan Boneh and Mathew Fanklin [2] propose an elegant scheme in the Random
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Oracle, using the pairing. Their proposition open the door to a more efficient scheme (with pairing),
we cite : Boneh-Franklin (BF) [2], Skai-Kasarah (SK) [3] under the model Randoms Oracles, Boneh-
Boyen (BB) [4] under the model selective ID, Water [5] and Gentry [6] under Standard Model. These
cryptosystems are the great themes of the cryptography IBE, because all the cryptosystems which
comming later : [7,8] and others, are just their modified.
After all these proposals several companies have begun working with IBE instead of the PKI. We can
cite Voltage Security and Nortech. This seeks to balance the standardization of the communication,
which is currently being prepared (already tried by IEEE [9]). But to do it we need a very thorough
study because we need to consider many things. In this study we make a comparison between the
main cryptosystems we have cited.
The comparison in the IBE has been treated in a lot of papers, for example : Boyen [10] call to
the standardization of BB1 (IEEE 1363.3) by showing its benefit. The same author [11] make a
comparison between BB1, SK, BF. In [7] Kiltz-Vahl propose two cryptosystems which they have
shown their advantage over that of Gentry and Kiltz-Galindo. Note that every time a cryptosystem
is invented it begins to describe their advantages over others. Unfortunately all these studies are
not conclusive. Because, either they do not take into account all the major cryptosytems, or the
numbers of the factors at which the comparison is based are insufficient. In this work we will make
a practical comparison between all the proposed cryptosystems, by integrating the most possible
factors and proposing a suitable schedule.
Usually the systems networks become more accessible and open, apparently an active adversary
(even passive) may not be limited to eavesdropping, but may take a more active role. She can
interact with honest parties, she may analyze some older responses, she can try to break some
problem of Diffie Hellman used in the target cryptosystem...That’s why it is out of habit and
within the cadre of standardization, that the security of each cryptosystem will be checked by
what is called studies of simulations. Those studies are introduced by [12], they are being done in
advance to test the rigidity of a cryptosystem. But all of them require that the identity wishing to
be attacked will be asked in the challenge phase. We call this, full domain. In 2003 Canetti et al.
[13] proposed a weaker security model, called selective identity IBE (sID-IBE). In this model the
adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity it intends to attack. In [14] Sanjit Chatterjee
et al have presented an extension of this model at which the adversary is allowed to vary the length
of the challenge identity. Which is not allowed in the sID model. Naturally any protocol secure in
the s+ID model is also secure in the s-ID model, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Even if the reduction from selective-ID IBE to fully secure IBE introduces a factor of N[4] (N will
be at least 2160 to make the problem bilinear rigid) in the security parameters of the system. Boneh
and Boyen in 2004 [4] have proposed tow efficient schemes BB1 and BB2 under this model. The
first one is in the approach of Commutative Blinding, it is an HIBE scheme based on the DBDHP
(Decisional of Bilinear Diffie and Hellman Problem). Until the second is in the Exponent-Inversion
approach, it is an IBE based on Dq-BDHIP (Decisional q-Invertible of Bilinear Diffie and Hellman
Problem).
As an IBE requires the use of a PKG to generate the private key, so alone PKG is insufficient.
Since, it will be a concentration in one. To avoid this the works [15][16] and others are proposed.
All them are heavy, because for k authority in hierarchy it necessitate to generate k element in
extract and in encrypt, in addition to k product of pairing in decrypt. This cost was reduced by
Boneh, Boyen, Goh [17]. In [17] the authors propose a scheme where the ciphertext size and the
decryption cost are independent of the hierarchy depth. The ciphertexts is always just three group
elements and decryption requires two bilinear map computations. This reduction influence on some
application such as Forward HIBE and Broadcast Encryption.
But even the authors in [17] reduce the cost in the syntax of HIBE, their scheme requires that the
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identity to be challenged will be in Zp
∗, because they necessitate it in the technique of the study of
simulation to remove the master key gα. This limit the choice of the identities which is a restrict.
More than that, their proposal was not familiarized with the notion of s+ID, and it is proven in
[14] that if want to convert s-ID to s+ID we will make a degradation of h (h=v-v+, v is the length
of the identity challenged, and v+ is the target prefix). This give a more advantage to attack the
cryptosystem, as we may have an advantage equal to hε.
Our second contribution behind this work is : To over come all this. Keeping the syntax of BB2
(noting that BB1 and BB2 are considered until 2011 [18] as an efficient schemes in the sID Model),
we will propose a scheme (with a little change in BB2) in the Commutative Blinding approach and
which requires only 1 pairing in decrypt contrary to BB1. With the same manner, we will reduce
the HIBE following BBG. This reduction, will help us to give a more efficient Forward HIBE and
even Broadcast Encryption. By contrast to BBG our result HIBE support s+ID model and it can
project in the Zp contrary to Zp
∗ as with BBG.
Organization
Firstly we will divide our work in tow categories : First goal and second goal.
We begging in the first goal by some preliminaries, section number 2.2 will be reserved to the
comparison (in two level : complexity and security). Our final decision will be given in section 2.3.
For the second goal we will also staring by some notions, it concerns the functionality of IBE, HIBE
and their security, in addition to that we give some preliminaries concerning the problem of Diffie
Hellman to be used. We reserve section 3.2 and 3.3 to our proposal for IBE and HIBE respectively,
then we test the efficiency of our schemes compared to BB1, BB2 and BBG. In section 3.4 we
demonstrate the utility of our scheme for Forward scheme. In the end we give a conclusion.
2 First goal
2.1 Some Preliminaries
Before giving some of these preliminaries, we remember that our first goal about this work is to
classify the main cryptosystems. The cryptosystem’s which are in competition are : Boneh Franklin,
Skai Kasarah, Boneh Boyen (BB1, BB2), Water, Gentry.
2.1.1 Relation of the Problems of Diffie and Hellman
2.1.1-1 Problem Bilinear of Diffie Hellman
Definition 1 : (Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Problem (k-BDHIP) [5]). Let k be an
integer, and x ∈ Z∗q , P2 ∈ G∗2, P1 = ψ(P2), eˆ : G1×G2 −→ GT . Given (P1, P2, xP2, x2P2, ..., xkP2),
compute eˆ(P1, P2)
1
x is difficult.
Definition 2 :New Problem : SiE-BDHP (Simple Exponent Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem).
We express it for the first time in the literature : Let k be an integer, (P1, P2) in G1 × G1, x∈Zq,
given P0, xP1, xP2, xP3, xP4, ..., xPk. Compute xP0 is difficult
Definition 3 :(Bilinear CAA1 (k-BCAA1) [19]). Let k be an integer, and x ∈ Zq∗, P2 ∈ G2∗
, P1 = ψ (P2), eˆ : G1 × G2 −→ GT . Given (P1, P2, xP2, h0, (h1, 1h1+xP2), ..., (hk , 1hk+xP2)), with
hi ∈ Zq, for 0 < i < k are distinct. Calculate eˆ(P1, P2)
1
(x+h0) is difficult.
Definition 4 : (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem BDHP [2]). Let G1, G2 two rings with
prime order q. Let eˆ : G1 × G2 −→ GT be an application admissible and bilinear and let P be a
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generator of G1. The BDHP in < G1, G2, eˆ > is so : Given < P, aP, bP, cP > for a, b, c ∈ Zq.
Calculate eˆ(P, P )abc ∈ G2 is difficult.
Definition 5 :(Augmented Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption q-ABDHP
[6]). Let k be an integer, and x ∈ Z∗q , P2 ∈ G∗2, P1 = ψ(P2), eˆ : G1 × G2 −→ GT , given
(P1, x
k+2P1, P2, xP2, x
2P2, ..., x
2kP2). Calculate eˆ(P1, P2)
xk+1 is difficult.
Definition 6 : Problem calculator of Diffie Hellman : CDHP. Given P, aP, bP can we find
or rather calculate abP ?
Definition 7 : Problem Decisional of Diffie Hellman
Given P, aP, bP, cP can we say that abP = cP ?. But this problem can be solved in polynomial
time after using the pairing, for example if we prove that : e(P,cP) = e(aP,bP) so abP = cP. This
strategy is valid to others problems for example the q-BDHIP and q-ABDHE
2.1.1-2 Relation
Firstly, we discuss and show the relationship between the problems of Bilinear Diffie Hellman,
with which the studies of simulations of the cryptosystems in competition are based. Study the
classification of these problems is useful, because the rigidity of these studies is based on them. So
we have :
BDHP (1) −→ BDHIP (2)
BDHP (1) −→ ABDHP (2)
BDHP (1) −→ DBDHP (3)
BDHIP (2) −→ DBDHIP (4)
ABDHP (2) −→ DABDHP (4)
Relation and Classification
We have classed DBDHP in class 3 compared with BDHIP and ABDHP, because, it can be calcu-
lated in polynomial time using the Pairing. And we give the same rank to ABDHP and BDHIP,
since until present, there is no relationship which can link these two problems, all we can say is
that they belong to the same category (queries in the form exponentiations).
As long as, DBDHP has a rank before that of DABDHP and DBDHIP, because, (ignoring that
BDHP −→ ABDHP and BDHIP) the BDHP is rigid than BDHIP and ABDHP. Since theses lat-
ter have complexity O( 3
√
q) after [20]. So, the DBDHP is also rigid than DABDHP and DBDHIP.
Recall that : BF (BDHP), SK (BDHIP), BB1 (BDHP) BB2 (DBDHIP), Water (DBDHP), Gentry
(DABDHP).
In the other part, IBE has been built to serve a broad category of a persons (in a classified area),
using a single system of parameter. The only things that is change is the private keys, which are
generated from a single master key for all the applications. So it may be that there exist enemies
among the customers (the domains), who are agree to break the Master key of the authority from
the syntax of the private key. So the success of this study related to the syntax of each private key.
The private key of the cryptosystems in competition are in the form : BF has the form SiE BDHP
(sQIDi for each i varied), that’s of SK has the form BCAA1 (
1
s+H(IDi )
). BB1 is based on PDL,
as so not to extract α, β, ̟ from respectively αPpub, βPpub, ωPpub. Also, we wouldn’t calcu-
late Pprive from rPprive, since, if this will be easy, it will be easy also to associate a random r
to(αH(ID) + β)Pprive + ωPprive. So, breaking easily the cryptosystem as we have the division of
two Pairing. For BB2 it has the private key following the form BCAA1 ( 1s1+IDi+s2r)). The syntax
of the private key of Water is like BB1 based on PDL, as that of Gentry is under the form BCAA1.
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As it is generally known the PDL has complexity O(
√
q) and the BCAA1 has O( 3
√
q) [20], as it
is from the category of the Problem Diffie Hellman in form Exponentiations. For the SiE-BDHP
we haven’t a complexity exact, all we can say is that it is less than PDL and more than BCAA1,
since PDL −→ SiE-BDHP −→ EBDHP −→ BCAA1 (EBDHP Exponent Bilinear Diffie Hellman
Problem [19]). So we have this classification following the rigidity of the private key : BF(2), SK(3),
BB1(1), BB2(3), Water(1), Gentry(3)
2.1.2 Random Oracle & Standard Model
Random Oracle : In cryptography, an oracle is a random that answers all queries proposed at
random and specific request (for more details we send the interested to[21])
The utilization of the Random Oracle has some dangers, we cite in this article :
The Random Oracle responds with random values and therefore, it will be difficult to precise
the suitability of its values with the conditions allowed. More, because of the random values of
the Random Oracles which are difficult to adapt, the crypto systems under this model use in
their demonstrations an arbitrarily values chosen. Which makes these cryptosystems unclear in
their study of simulations (qH is not related directly to the syntax of the cryptosystem but it is
arbitrary). The Random Oracle still has more danger and to knowing it we refer the interested to
[22]. By contrast, in the Standard Model, which use any Random Model we are sure about what
is happening, as we use the Mathematical formulas. But in the Random Oracle we communicate
with a spirit random which hasn’t any exact measure.
2.1.3 Studies of Simulations
The studies of simulations are invented by [12], they are being done in advance to test the rigidity
of a cryptosystem. And in this article we cite :
CPA : Is the abbreviation of Chosen Plaintext Attack ie during the studies of simulations the
opponent has advantage to access to the encrypted of his chosen texts.
CCA : It is an abbreviated of Chosen Ciphertext Attack, and we divide it into two parts : CCA1
and CCA2. During CCA the adversary has advantage of access to the decrypts texts he has chosen.
In the CCA1 the opponent is less limited by comparison with CCA2. We must say that the CCA2
is the most powerful among all these attacks.
In 2003 Canetti, Halevi and Katz proposed an alternative strategy in the study of simulation, at
which the adversary must commit ahead of time to the challenge identity. And so, the identity
to attack must be declared in advance. This early model is referred as selective-identity attack
(sID), while the Original Model is called Full-identity scenario (ID). According to [23] the selec-
tive ID (sID-CCA/CCP) is less rigid than (ID-CCA/CCP). The ID-CCA is required to merit the
Standardization.
2.1.4 Advantage of the Cryptosystem
In this section, we compare the advantage of each cryptosystem in competition. Recall that an
advantage is done to learn the skill of an opponent to break a cryptosystem, basing on specifically
mathematical probabilities. For our cryptosystems we have :
AdvBF (Advantage of BF) =
1
(qH3+qH4)qH2
[( εqH2
(1− qEqH1 )+1)(1−
2
p)
qD−1] −36 ∼ εqH3 (1−
2
p)
qD ; AdvSK
= ( εq1+1)(1 − 2p)qD . For the two crypto system BB1 and BB2 we utilize a propriety demonstrated
by Boneh Boyen [4] which say that :
Let (t, qS, ε)-selective identity secure IBE system (IND-sID-CPA). Suppose E admits N distincts
identities. Then E is also a (t, qS, Nε)-fully secure IBE (IND-ID-CPA). So basing in this propriety
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we have : AdvBB1 = ε.2
n. qH(2n−qS) ; AdvBB2 = ε.2
n. As long as following [5] and [6] we extract easily :
AdvWater=
ε
32(n+1)q ; AdvGentry= ε+4
qC
p . To compare this advantages we take into consideration :
qS & qD < qH < n << p. So we have :
AdvWater < AdvBF < AdvSK < AdvGentry < AdvBB1 < AdvBB2. Consequently, Water is the most
desirable as it has a very small advantage
2.1.5 Anonymity
Anonymity is a method to distinguish the identity of a person from the ciphertext. This property
is more desirable in cryptography, because it limits the activity of an opponent in the beginning.
As a result, the opponent will be incapable to know the person addressed in the ciphertext. For
our cryptosystems only Boneh Franklin and Gentry are Anonymous
2.1.6 Pairing
A pairing is a bilinear map that takes two points on an elliptic curve and gives an element of the
group multiplicative of n-th roots of unity. Among the pairing we cited : Weil, Tate, Ate, η, but in
the implementations cryptographic we often use Weil and Tate.
Pairing of Weil
The Weil pairing is defended as follows : er :E[r] × E[r] → µr (µr is the set of the rth root of the
unity) such that : er(P,Q) =
fDQ(DP )
fDP (DQ)
Pairing of Tate
The Tate pairing is the application :
tr :E(k)[r]×E(k)/rE(k) → k∗/(k∗)r
(P,Q)→tr(P,Q)=fDP (DQ) modulo (k∗)r. And to have an exact value, it can be defined as follows :
tr(P,Q) = (fDP (DQ))
(qk−1)/r
2.1.7 Inverse of two Pairing
The inverse of two pairing is calculate as [24]
e(P1,Q1)
e(P2,Q2)
= e(P1, Q1)e(P2,−Q2), and if we take P1 and P2 with the same order, we can so utilize
the same algorithm of Miller to calculate the inverse of two pairing. The only things we change is
instead of f1 ← f12 × l1(Q1)v1(Q1) we calculate f1 ← f1
2 × l1(Q1)v1(Q1)×
l1(Q2)
v1(Q2)
also instead of
f1 ← f1 × l2(Q1)v2(Q1) we calculate f1 ← f1 ×
l2(Q1)
v2(Q1)
× l2(Q2)v2(Q2) .
The calculation of the pairing is ineffective until the invention of the algorithm of Miller in 1986.
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Miller(P, Q, r)
Input : r = (rn...r0)(binary representation ),
P ∈ E[r](⊂ E(Fq)) and Q ∈ G1(⊂ E(Fqk))
Output : fr,P (Q) ∈ G3 (⊂ F ∗qk)
T ← P
f1 ← 1
for i = n - 1 to 0 do
1 : T ← [2]T
f1 ← f12 × l1(Q)v1(Q)
l1 is the tangent to the curve in T.
V1 is the vertical to the curve in [2]T.
2 : if ri=1 then
f1 ← f1 × l2(Q)v2(Q)
l2 is the line passing through the point TP
V2 is the vertical to the point P + T.
Output : Return f1
2.1.8 Haching on an elliptic Curve
In the cryptosystem of Boneh and Franklin there is, the problem of Hashing Function in an elliptic
curve selected. And to do it we remember the method suited by Boneh Franklin
Map to point
0. Project the ID using : H1 : ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ −→ y0 ∈ Fp
1. Calculate x0 = (y0
2 − 1) 13 = (y02 − 1)
2p−1
3 ∈ Fp.
2. Let Q = (x0, y0) ∈ E(Fp) after calculate QID = lQ ∈ G.
3. Output MapToPoint(y0) = QID.
2.1.9 Cryptosystems in Competition
The cryptosytems in competition are Boneh and Franklin, Skai Kasarah, Boneh Boyen, Water,
Gentry. In this article we choose them, taking into account the most recent changes to make them
effective. So for Boneh and Franklin we prefer to use that of Galnido [25] instead of the version of
Boneh and Franklin. Because Galnido provide reduction in the advantage of Boneh Franklin. More,
this latter is valid only on supersingular curve, as it uses symmetric pairing. By contrast, Galnido
use asymmetric pairing of type II and he established his argument based on them. Following [26]
the asymmetric pairing, with which we can use ordinary curves are more convenient in implemen-
tations than the symmetric one.
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Boneh-Franklin (Galindo-Full Version)
Setup. Let (G1, G2, GT , ψ) a bilinear group. Choose a generator
P2 ∈ G2 and set P1 = ψ(P2). Next pick s←− Zp
and set Qpub = sP2 ∈ G2⋆ → Ppub = sP1 ∈ G1∗.
Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ ←− G2⋆ ,
H2 : GT ←− {0, 1}n, H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n ←− Zp∗,
H4 : {0, 1}n ←− {0, 1}n. The message space is M= {0, 1}n
and the ciphertext space is C = G1
∗ × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract. For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute QID = H1(ID)
and set the private key dID to be dID = sQID ∈ G2∗.
Encrypt. To encrypt M ∈ 0, 1n under identity ID, compute
QID= H1(ID) ∈ G2∗, choose σ ←− {0, 1}n,
set r = H3(σ,M) ∈ Zp⋆ and finally
C = < rP1, σ
⊕
H2(g
r
ID),M
⊕
H4(σ) >
where gID = e(Ppub, QID) ∈ GT .
Decrypt. Let C = < U, V,W > ∈ C be a ciphertext under the identity
ID. To decrypt C using the private key dID ∈ G2⋆ do :
1. Compute V
⊕
H2(e(U, dID)) = σ.
2. Compute W
⊕
H4(σ) =M .
3. Set r = H3(σ,M). Check that U = rP.
If not, reject the ciphertext.
4. Output M.
Sakai-Kasaharah (ChenCheng-Full Version)
Setup. Let (G1, G2, GT , ψ) a bilinear group. Choose a generator
P2 ∈ G2 and set P1 = ψ(P2). Next pick s←− Zp
and set Qpub = sP2 ∈ G2⋆ → Ppub = sP1 ∈ G1∗. Choose
crypto graphic hash functions H1 : 0, 1
∗ ←− G2⋆,
H2 : GT ←− {0, 1}n, H3 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n ←− Zp∗,
H4 : {0, 1}n ←− {0, 1}n. The message space is M= {0, 1}n
and the ciphertext space is C = G1
∗ × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract : Given an identifer string IDA ∈ {0, 1}n of entity A, Mpk
and Msk, the algorithm returns dA=
1
s+H1(IDA)
P2
Encrypt : Given a plaintext m ∈ M , IDA and Mpk,
the following step are formed :
1.pick a random σ ∈ {0, 1}n and compute r=H3(σ,m)
2.Compute QA = H1(IDA)P1 + Ppub, g
r=e(P1, P2)
r
Set the ciphertext to be C = (rQA, σ ⊕H2(gr), m ⊕H4(σ))
Decrypt : Given a ciphertext C = (U,V,W)∈C, IDA, dA
and Mpk, follow the steps
1.Compute g’=e(U, dA) and σ
′ = V ⊕H2(g′)
2.Compute m’=W ⊕ H4(σ′) and r’= H3(σ′,m′)
3.If U 6= r′(H1(IDA)P1 + Ppub) output ⊥
else return the m’ as the plintext
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Boneh-Boyen
BB1(Full Version)
Setup : To generate IBE system parameters, pick ω, α,
β, γ ∈ Zp, and output, params = { P, P1 = αP,
P2 = βP,, v0 = e(P, Pˆ )
ω} ∈ G13 ×Gt,
masterk = (Pˆ , ω, α, β) ∈ G2 × Zp4.
Let g1 and g2 be the respective generators of some
bilinear group pair (G1, G2) of prime order p, And let
e : G1 × G2 −→ Gt be a bilinear pairing map.
The availability of three cryptographic hash functions
viewed as random oracles graphic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ ←− Zp , H2 : Gt ←− {0, 1}n,
H3 : Gt × {0, 1}n ×G1× G2 ←− Zp.
The message space is M= {0, 1}n and
The ciphertext space is C = G1
∗ × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract : To extract from masterk a private key dID for an
identity ID∈ {0, 1}l , pick a random r∈ Zp and output
dID = (d0 = (ω + (αH1(ID) + β])r)Pˆ , d1 = rPˆ ).
Encrypt : Given a plaintext m ∈ M , IDA and Mpk,
the following step are formed :
C =


c = M
⊕
H2(k = v
s
0),
c0 = sP,
c1 = H1(ID)sP1 + sP2,
t = s + H3(k, c, c0, c1) mod p )
where M ∈ {0,1} is the message, ID ∈ {0, 1}
is the recipient identifier, and s ∈ Zp
is a random ephemeral integer.
Decrypt : Given a ciphertext C and a private key dID = (d0, d1),
compute, k = e(c0,d0)e(c1,d1) , s= t - H3(k, c, c0, c1).
If (k, c0) 6= = ( vs0, sP ), output ⊥ ;
otherwise, output, M = c
⊕
H2(k).
BB2 (Version CPA)
Setup outputs Msk ←− (a,b) and
Pub ←− ( P, Pa = aP, Pb = bP, v = e(P, Pˆ ))
for a, b ∈ Fp chosen at random.
Extract(Msk,Id) outputs
PvkId ←− ( rId = r, .dˆId = −1a+Id+br Pˆ ) for r ∈ Fp
Encrypt(Pub, Id, Msg, s) outputs
Ctx ←− (c0 =Msg.vs, c1 = sPa + sIdP, c2 = sPb).
Decrypt(Pub, PvkId, Ctx) outputs
Msg’ ←− c0.e(c1 + rIdc2, dˆId) ∈ Gt.
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Water (Naccache-Version CPA)
Setup :Choose a secret parameters α ∈ Zp at random,
choose a random generator g ∈ G and set the value
g1 = αg also choose at randomly g2 ∈ G.
The authority choose a random value u’ ∈ G
and a random n length vector U=(ui) chosen at
random from G. The publish parameters are
params < g,g1,g2,u’,U > the master secret is αg2
Key Generation : Let v = (v1, ..., vn) ∈ ({0, 1}a)n
be an identity, Let r be random in Zp
The private key dv for identity v is construc
ted as : dv = (αg2 + r(u
′ +
∑n
i=1 ui),rg)
Encryption :A message M ∈ G1 is encrypted
for an identity v as follows.
A value t ∈ Zp is chosen at random
The ciphertext is then constructed as :
C=(e(g1, g2)
tM, t.g, t.(u′ +
∑n
i=1 ui)))
Decryption :Let C=(c1, c2, c3) be a valid encryption
of M under the identity v. Then C can be
decrypts by dv=(d1, d2) as : c1
e(d2,C3)
e(d1,C2)
=M
Gentry(Full-Version)
Setup :The PKG picks a random generators <g, h1, h2, h3 >
and a random α ∈ Zp. It sets g1 = αg ∈ G. It chooses a
hash function H from a family of universal one-way hash
functions. The public params and private master-key are
given by params = <g,g1,h1,h2,h3,H> master-key=α
Key Gen :To generate a private key for identity ID ∈ Zp,
the PKG generates random rID,i ∈ Zp for
i ∈ {1,2,3} and output the private key
dID={(rID,i,hID,i : i ∈ {1,2,3}, where
hID,i=
1
α−ID (hi+(rID,ig)) If ID = α, the PKG aborts.
Encrypt :To encrypt m ∈ GT using identity ID ∈ Zp, the
sender generates random s ∈ Zp and send the
ciphertext C =


u=sg1 + (−sID)g,
v=e(g, g)s,
w=m.e(g, h1)
−s,
y=e(g, h2)
se(g, h3)
sβ
Above, for C=(u,v,w,y) we set β=H(u,v,w)
Decrypt :To decrypt ciphertext C=(u,v,w,y) with ID
the recepient sets β=H(u,v,w) and test wether
y=e(u,hID,2h
β
ID,3)v
rID,2+rID,3β If the check
fails, the recipient output ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs
m=w.e(u, hID,1)v
rID,1
Justification of the Choose
We are making our choose based on the recent modifications concerning the cryptosystems in
competition. For that of Boneh and Franklin, we have justified the version of Galnido. As that of
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Skai Kasarah, we prefere to use the version of Chen-Cheng [19] which is CCA secure. As far as
concerned, the version of BB1 we will utilize the Random oracle version, such that BB1 has a lot of
versions : Random Oracle, selectiveID, and also Standard Model. We will only play on the H1, but
we prefer the first one, because we have the cryptosystem of Water which has the same syntax as
BB1 and is under Standard Model. As long as, that of Water we will use the version of Nackache
which utilize the Words instead of the alphabet. And this reduce the complexity
2.2 Efficient Comparison
As we have signaled Xavier. Boyen in 2008 essayed to make the comparison [11] between Boneh
Franklin, Skai Kasarah and BB1. By counting for example the numbers of the parameters for
each cryptosystem, the groups associates, the propriety associates. More he has calling to the
standardization of the cryptosystem BB1 [10] using the same method. Unfortunately his essay isn’t
practical for the raison that he don’t compute the complexity exact (spatial and temporal) for
each cryptosystem. He fixed only the basis and he bagun to compute following the number of the
parameters. He posed some critters and he verified if only the cryptosystems has it or not without
demonstrate any classification. By contrast, in our comparison we will follow another strategy. We
pose a scale which we make in the consideration the utility of the propriety, this allow us to precise
the best cryptosystem.
2.2.1 Comparison in the level Security
Before staring the comparison in the level of security we remember firstly the following things :
BF SK BB1 BB2 Water Gentry
RO RO RO & sID RO & sID SM SM
BDHP BDHIP BDHP DBDHIP DBDHP Dq-ABDHP
CCA CCA CPA CPA CPA CCA
SiE-BDHP BCAA1 PDL BCAA1 PDL BCAA1
To rank the crypto systems in direction security, we give the scale following the usefulness of each
propriety. Concerning the model utilized : RO is the worst case as long as SM is the better, until sID
is between them, therefore : RO (rank 3), sID (rank 2), SM (rank 1). But because of the very great
dangers of RO [22] and as we presented a few of them in section 2.1.2 we double these coefficients
in the table below. In the other part, because of the utility of the anonymity for the security, as it
can early block the activity of the opponent we reducing the rank to 0 for those that have it and
we give 2 to those they don’t have it. For the remaining criteria we follow the classification we done
in the section 2.1.1 ; 2.1.4
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Table 1 – classification in the level security
BF SK BB1 BB2 Water Gentry
Model 6 6 4 4 2 2
ProDH 1 2 1 4 3 4
Avd 2 3 5 6 1 4
Simu 0 0 1 1 1 0
ProDHpriv 2 3 1 3 1 3
Ano 0 2 2 2 2 0
Sum 11 16 14 20 10 13
Class (2sd) (5th) (4th) (6th) (1st) (3th)
2.2.2 Comparison in the level Complexity
In [10][11] Xavier Boyen tried to establish a base, from which he tried to compte the time for the
crypto systems that are affected. But we can say that his results are not accurate enough, because,
he doesn’t take into account some operations such as : inverse, multiplication etc. By contrast in
our study we compte the most possibles operations. More our complexity can combine between
spatial and temporal
Complexity associate
We assemble our own complexity in the following tables.
With the fact that in table III we set the parameters, with a manner to reduce more possibly the
calculation, for example, instead of placing g = e(P1, P2)(in SK cryptosystem) in the Encrypt at
which we will recalculate it each time, we publish it among the Params
In the table IV the following symbol significate :
C : Complexity ;Mulsca : Multiplication Scalar ; Expffi : Exponentiation in the finite field ; Invffi :
Inversion in the finite field ;Mulffi : Multiplication in the finite field ; pair : Pairing ; Inv of 2 pair :
Inversion of two pairing
Table 2 – Parameter Associate
BFGa SKCC
sP1 sP1 ; g = e(P1, P2)
QID (map to point) ;sQID
1
s+H1(ID)
P2
u=rP2 ; e(Ppub, QID)
r Q = H1(ID)P1 + Ppub; g
r;u = rQ
e(u, dID) e(u, dID) ;r’QA
BB1 BB2 WaterNa
αP1;βP2; e(P, Pˆ ) ;v0 aP1; bP2; e(P, Pˆ ) αg1; v = e(g1, g2)
(ω + r(αH1(ID) + β))Pˆ ; rPˆ
1
a+ID+br Pˆ αg2 + r(U
′ +
∑n
i=1Ui) ;rg
vs0; sP ;H1(ID)sP1; sP2 m.v
s; sPa; sIdP ; sPb v
t; tg; t(U ′ +
∑
i=1
nUi)
e(c0,d0)
e(c1,d1)
;vs0 ; sP c0.e(c1 + rIdc2, dˆId) c1.
e(c3,d2)
e(c2,d1)
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Gentry
v0 = e(g, g); v1 = e(g, h1); v2 = e(g, h2); v3 = e(g, h3)
1
α−ID (hi + rID,ig), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
u ; vs0 ; m.v
−s
1 ; v
s
2.v
sβ
3
y = e(u, hID,2 + βhID,3)v0
rID,2+rID,3β ;w.e(u, hID,1)v
rID,1
Table 3 – Complexity associate
BFGa SKCC
C(Mulsca) C(Mulsca)+C(pair)
C(map to point)+C(Mulsca) C(Invffi)+ C(Mulsca)
C(Mulsca)+C(pair)+C(Expffi) 2C(Mulsca)+C(Expffi)
C(pair) C(pair)+C(Mulsca)
BB1
2C(Mulsca)+C(pair)+C(Expffi)
2C(Mulffi)+ 2C(Mulsca)
3C(Mulsca)+C(Expffi)+C(Mulffi)
C(Inv of 2 pair)+C(Expffi)+C(Mulsca)
BB2
2C(Mulsca)+C(pair)
C(Invffi)+ C(Mulsca)+C(Mulffi)
3 C(Mulsca)+C(Expffi)+2C(Mulffi)
C(Mulffi)+C(pair)+C(Mulsca)
WaterNa
C(Mulsca)+C(pair)
4 C(Mulsca)
3 C(Mulsca)+C(Expffi)+ C(Mulffi)
C(Mulffi)+C(Inv of 2 pair)
Gentry
4C(pair)
3 C(Mulsca)+C(Invffi)
2 C(Mulsca)+ 4C(Expffi)+C(Invffi)+2C(Mulffi)
4C(Mulffi)+2C(pair)+
C(Mulsca)+2C(Expffi)
Observation :To calculate the Multiplication Scalar we consider in this article that the ope-
ration of adding and doubling are equal so for
example : (U ′ +
∑
i=1
nUi) is considered as one Scalar Multiplication.
Complexity Neighboring
In this section we begin to fix the complexity for each cryptosystem. We can say that they are
a complexity neighbor, since we do not take into account : addition, subtraction, calculation of
hashed functions... More we balance between the complexity of square with that of multiplication.
Our method help us to have a nearest comparison between the cryptosystem’s in competition,
because we will concentrate only on the main arithmetic (operation used) : multiplication, square,
exponentiation, scalar multiplication in each cryptosystem.
Following [27] we have : :
1. C(compute of m× n) = O((logn)2)
2. C(compute of gcd(m, n)) = C(compute of m−1) = O((logn)3) = C(compute of m−1 (mod n)) =
13
O((logn)3)
For the exponentiation we consider in this article the algorithm Right-to-left binary exp [28] which
has complexity equivalent to :
(12 lgn)Mu + (lgn)Sq = (
3
2 lgn)Mu (as declared C(Mu)=C(Sq) ). Those complexity are not a per-
suade complexity and to make an exact one we will use the newest method used in the literature.
But this help us to order the main operation in arithmetic, as [29] we have according to those
complexity : C(multiplication) < C(inverse) < C(exponentiation)
In [11] Boyen balance between exponentiation xn and the scalar multiplication [n]P as we can apply
the same operations to crush the n. This is not true, because we must consider for [n]P an additional
complexity :
Following [29], in jacobian coordinate we have :
C(ECADD)=12Mu+2Sq=14O((logn)2) (C(Mu)=C(Sq) the Z 6= 1)
And C(ECDBL)=7Mu+5Sq=13O((logn)2) (a 6= -3)
With ECADD : designs elliptic curve point adding P+Q, ECDBL : designs elliptic curve point
doubling 2P.
Also following [29] and using NAF algorithm we have :
C(dP)=(n-1)ECDBL+ (n−1)3 ECADD=13(n-1)O((logn)
2)+14 (n−1)3 O((logn)
2)=533 (n-1)O((logn)
2).
And C(2nP)=4nMu+(4n+2)Sq=(8n+2)O((logn)2) i.e for d=2n.
According to algorithm Maptopoint we have :
C(Maptopoint)= C(1 square) + C(1 cubic root) + C(1 multiplication scalar)
So : C(Maptopoint) = O((logn)2) + O(lglgn) + 533 (n-1)O((logn)
2) (complexity of the cubic root
is O(lglgn) following an algorithm in [28])
For the complexity of the pairing we will take into consideration, as possible all the reduction we
can apply to reduce the pairing. We take for example Tate because Weil is heavy (two time bigger
than Tate). So we have :
C(pairing=Tate)=C(Miler)+C(Exponentiation), since tr = (fr)
qk−1
r
With a naive calculate we have :
Starting with the complexity of the algorithm of Miller. We neglect as customary to accelerate
the compute, the second tranche of the algorithm of Miller supposing that our r (for example
r=397 + 349 + 1, so we can neglect 3 bit in front of 94 bit) is cruse.
Firstly, we have tr = (fr(DQ))
qk−1
r = (
fr,P (Q+S)
fr,P (S)
)
qk−1
r with DQ = [Q+S]-[S] for an arbitrary chosen
S in the elliptic curve concerned. The algorithm of Miller is resumed in table 4
In this algorithm, we need three stages : (1) computation of ECDBL (we neglect ECADD) (2)
computation of l1(Q+ S), l1(S), v1(Q+ S), v1(S) (3) update of f1
According to [29] we have so : C(Miller )= r log2(4Muk + 2Sqk + (6k + 7)Mu + 7Sq) with r log2
is the number of iterations. If r is in the same level of security as n, we will have :
C(Miller )= n log2(4Muk + 2Sqk + (6k + 7)Mu + 7Sq).
NB :
1. Even if we are basing in a work[29] made in 2003, but this complexity is nearest to the one[30]
done in 2009 section II.2.1. And in this latter the author don’t take into account l1(Q + S),
v1(Q+ S), multiplication : l1(Q+ S)× v1(S), l1(S)× v1(Q+ S)
2. k designs the embedding degree of the field used. For example Fpk ; Muk : multiplication in
this field ; Sqk : squaring in this field.
3. Certain work use twist which eliminate the calculate of v1, this is possible for embedding degree
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Table 4 – first tranche
Compute of
fr,P (Q+S)
fr,P (S)
: first tranche
Input : r = (rn...r0)(binary representation ),
P ∈ E[r](⊂ E(Fq)) and Q ∈ G1(⊂ E(Fqk ))
S ∈ G1(⊂ E(Fqk))
Output : fr,P (Q) ∈ G3 (⊂ F ∗qk )
T ← P
f1 ← 1
for i = n - 1 to 0 do
1 : T ← [2]T
f1 ← f12 × l1(Q+S)l1(S) ×
v1(S)
v1(Q+S)
l1 is the tangent to the curve in T.
v1 is the vertical to the curve in [2]T.
divided by 2, 3, 4, 6. But we don’t take it into consideration in this work
4. According to[31], for k=2i3j Muk = 3
i5jMu ; Muk ∼ Sqk so Sqk ∼= 3i5jMu.
We take k=2i3j as an experiment embedding to make our comparison, this because of last step :
step number 4. And the fact that C(Mu)≃ C(Sq). So :
C(Miller )= nlog2 ((6.3i5j + (6k + 14))O((logn)2)).
For k=12 and in a level of security =80. We have :C(Miller )=28480 Log 2O(6400(log2)2).
C(pairing)=nlog2 ((6.3i5j + (6k + 14))O((logn)2))+(32 lgn)O((logn)
2))
We move now to the inversion of two pairing :
According to section 2.1.7 instead of calculate
tr1 (Dr1 (DQ1 ))
tr2 (Dr2 (DQ2 ))
=
(fr1,P1 (DQ1 ))
qk−1
r1
(fr2,P2 (DQ2 ))
qk−1
r1
, if P1 and P2 have the
same order r=r1 = r2, we calculate only tr(Dr(DQ1)) × tr(Dr(DQ2)). This reduce the complexity
from 4Muk to only 2Muk (as inversion in Fpk is approximated to 4Muk following [29])
Using this, the technique proposed in the section 2.1.7 and complexity given in [29] (first tranche),
we have :
C(Inversion of Tate Pairing)=nLog2(2(4Mu + 6Sq) + 2(3Mu + 1Sq) + 4(3kMu) + 4Muk +2Sqk)
+ 1C(exponent)= (28+12k + 6.3i5j)Mu+ 32 lognO(logn
2)=nLog2(28+12k+6.3i5j)O((logn)2) + 32
lognO(logn2)
We will use all this complexity in the following section when we have ambiguity.
Efficient Classification
To classify our cryptosystems we compared them following each taps : Params, Extract, Encrypt,
Decypt. So we have following the complexity in table 3 and the complexity declared in the previous
section :
It is clear from table 3 that :(BF −Gentry)Params < (SK − ChenCheng)Params &WaterParams <
BB2Params. To compareBB1Params andGentryParams we will compare only 2C(Mulsca)+C(Expffi)
and 3C(pair). As we have 1063 (n − 1)+32 logn < (Log2n)(18.3i.5j+ 3(6k+14)+92Logn), BB1Params
< GentryParams.
So : (BF −Gentry)Params < (SK − ChenCheng)Params &WaterParams <BB2Params <BB1Params
< GentryParams.
For the Extract, the fact that Mulsca has in its formulate an Mul and Sq multiplied by n, will help
us in a more statement. The only ambiguity that we can have is between BF and BB1, but as we
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have C(square root)<C(Mul) we will have :
(SK − ChenCheng)Extract < BB2Extact < (BF −Galnido)Extract < BB1Extract< GentryExtract
< WaterExtract.
In the level Encrypt we have regrouped the complexity for each cryptosystem, using the fact that
an inversion in Fpk is approximated to 4Muk [29] (for Gentry) we find that :
(SK − ChenCheng)Encrypt <BB1Encrypt &WaterEncrypt <BB2Encrypt<GentryEncrypt < (BF −Galnido)Encrypt.
As far as for the Decrypt we have :
(BF −Galnido)Decrypt < (SK − ChenCheng)Decrypt < WaterDecrypt < BB2Decrypt < BB1Decrypt
< GentryDecrypt. The classification between (BF −Galnido)Decrypt - (SK − ChenCheng)Decrypt ;
as well as BB2Decrypt - BB1Decrypt and BB1Decrypt - GentryDecrypt are clair. We have an ambi-
guity between WaterDecrypt and BB2Decrypt, WaterDecrypt and (SK − ChenCheng)Decrypt. But
as we have nlog2(28+12k+6.3i .5j)+1 > nlog2(6.3i.5j+6k+14)+ 532 (n-1), because (14+6k)log2+1>
53
2 (n-1) (we can take the minimal case k=2) we can so conclude.
Table 5 – Classification
BFGal SKCh−Chg BB1 BB2 Water Gentry
Params 1 2 4 3 2 5
Extract 3 1 4 2 6 5
Encrypt 5 1 2 3 2 4
Decrypt 1 2 5 4 3 6
Sum 10 6 15 12 13 20
Class (2sd) (1st) (5th) (3th) (4th) (6th)
2.3 Final Classification
As a consequent of all what we have seen before, we regrouped our results in the following table :
BF SK BB1 BB2 Water Gentry
Class TABLE 1 (2sd) (5th) (4th) (6th) (1st) (3th)
Class TABLE 5 (2sd) (1st) (5th) (3th) (4th) (6th)
Sum 4 6 9 9 5 9
Final Class1 (1
st) (3th) (4th) (4th) (2sd) (4th)
2.4 Propriety Associate
In this section as [11] we also enriched our study with the additional properties such as : Multi-
recipient encryption, Threshold secret sharing, Hierarchical identities. Our comparison is totaly
difference from that of [11]. Because we do not mark only the property as [11] to the crypto
systems, but we test the best crypto system which verify the property wished.
We make firstly the following recall with a little details :
Multi-recipient encryption (1) : Is the act of encrypting a single message to multiples users.
So this priority requires a small Encrypt
Threshold secret sharing (2) : Is the fact of dividing the key Master on several authorities, to
avoid the concentration on one. And each of them has the advantage to calculate a corresponding
16
private key. So this priority requires a small Extract
Hierarchical Identity (3) : Is the fact of arranging multiples identities in the hierarchy (many
authorities classify in an hierarchy) using the same Params. So each of the super authority generate
the corresponding key to its down. This priority requires Extract and Encrypt smaller. Its
ranking is calculated as (Extract + Encrypt)
BF SK BB1 BB2 Water Gentry
M-r enc (1) 5 1 2 3 2 4
Th s sh (2) 3 1 4 2 6 5
Hi id (3) 4 1 3 2 4 5
Sum 12 3 9 7 12 14
Class2 (4
th) (1st) (3sd) (2th) (4th) (5th)
Specific ClassF i =
Class1 +Class2 (2
st) (1st) (4sd) (3th) (3st) (5th)
3 Second goal
In the following sections, we will give an efficient schemes IBE/HIBE in the model selective ID. A
comparison in terms of performance and complexity with BB1 and BBG scheme is in favor of our
scheme.
3.1 Preliminaries
To be familiarized with the difference between IBE and HIBE, we give in the following the func-
tionality of each others.
3.1.1 Functionality of IBE :
An IBE system contains four basic components in its construction :
Setup : A trusted central authority manages the parameters with which keys are created. This
authority is called the Private Key Generator or PKG. The PKG takes a security parameter k and
returns params (system parameters) and master-key. The system parameters will be publicly
known, while the master-key will be known only to the (PKG).
Extract : Takes as input params, master-key, and an arbitrary IDR, it returns a private key
dIDR .
Encryption :When Alice wishes to encrypt a message to Bob, he encrypts the message to him by
computing or obtaining the public key, and then encrypting a plaintext message M with params,
IDBob to obtain ciphertext C.
Decryption : When Bob has C, he contact the PKG to obtain the private key SBob, he decrypts
C to obtain the plaintext message M.
3.1.2 IBE security notions
As it was known Boneh and Franklin define in [2] a chosen ciphertext security for IBE systems un-
der a chosen identity attack. In this model the adversary is allowed to adaptively chose the public
key it wishes to attack. In [13] Canetti, Halevi, and Katz define another notion it is a weaker notion
of security. In this model the adversary commits ahead of time to the public key it will attack.
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Before giving its functionality we recall firstly that the security of a cryptographic scheme com-
bining the possible goals and attack models. The most important goal are : indistinguishability
(IND/sIND), Semantic Security. Regarding attacks we have : chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA),
chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). The relation between all this was given in [32].
Definition :IND-ID/sID-{CCA, CPA}
Let Γ = (S,X,E,D) be an IBE scheme, and let A = (A0, A1, A2) be any 3-tuple of PPT oracle
algorithms. For ATK = ID/sID-CPA, ID/sID-CCA, we say Γ is IND/sID-ATK secure if for
any 3-tuple of PPT oracle algorithms A,| ℘r(1)-℘r(2) | ∈ neg , where
℘r(i)=


v = 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(id,γ)←− A0(1l)
(pms,mk) ←− S(1l) ;
((m(1),m(2), idch), σ)←− AO1,O21 (pms, id, γ)
c←− E(pms, idch,m(i));
v ←− AO1,O22 (σ, (idch, c))


.
The expression represent the oracles O1, O2. Additionally, m
(1) and m(2) are required to have
the same length ; neither A1 nor A2 are allowed to query O1 on the challenge identity idch, and
A2 can not query O2 on the challenge pair (idch, c). These queries may be asked adaptively
(like CCA2 after phase 2), that is, each query may depend on the answers obtained to the
previous queries.
3.1.3 Functionality of HIBE
Like IBE system, the Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption (HIBE) system consists of four algo-
rithms [15][16] : Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt.
In HIBE, however, identities are vectors, a vector of dimension k represents an identity at depth k.
The Setup algorithm generates system parameters, denoted by params, and a master key master-
key. We refer to the master-key as the private key at depth 0 and note that an IBE system is a
HIBE where all identities are at depth 1. Algorithm KeyGen takes as input an identity ID = (I1, .
. . , Ik) at depth k and the private key dID|k − 1 of the parent identity ID|k-1 = (I1, . . . , Ik−1)
at depth k -1, and then outputs the private key dID for identity ID. The encryption algorithm
encrypts messages for an identity using params and the decryption algorithm decrypts ciphertexts
using the private key.
3.1.4 The main approach of IBE
We can classify the cryptosystems of IBE in three categories :
• Full-Domain-Hash approach : In this model we project in the elliptic curve instead of the finite
field, its prototype is summarized by the idea of Boneh-Franklin [2].
• • Exponent-Inversion approach : In this approach the identity key to be used in the Extract is
as an inverse. The second scheme of Boneh-Boyen (BB2)[4], that’s of Sakai-Kasahara (SK) [3],
also Gentry [6] work with this approach.
• • • Commutative-Blinding approach, defined by the first IBE scheme of Boneh-Boyen (BB1)[4].
It is based on the idea of creating, from two or more secret coefficients, two blinding factors that
commute with each other under the pairing. The main quality that characterize this paradigm
is the greater flexibility provided by its algebraic structure. Since the identity presented in the
Extract is in the form linear.
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3.1.5 Selective Identity IBE/HIBE Security Notions
Selective Identity for an IBE function as follow, but we give only version CPA i.e without using
the extraction decrypt queries in phase 1 :
Init :
The adversary outputs an identity ID∗ where it wishes to be challenged.
Setup :
The challenger runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the adversary the resulting system parameters
params. It keeps the master-key to itself.
Phase 1 :
The adversary issues queries q1, ..., qm where query qi is :
– Private key query < IDi > where IDi 6= ID∗ and IDi is not a prefix of ID∗. The challenger
responds by running algorithm KeyGen to generate the private key di corresponding to the
public key < IDi >. It sends di to the adversary.
Challenge :
Once the adversary decides that Phase 1 is over it outputs two equal length plaintextsM0,M1 ∈
M on which it wishes to be challenged. The challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets
the challenge ciphertext to C = Encrypt(params, ID∗,Mb). It sends C as the challenge to the
adversary.
Phase 2 :
As phase 1
Guess :
Finally, the adversary outputs a guess b0 ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary wins if b = b0.
We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-sID-CPA adversary. We define the advantage of the
adversary A in attacking the scheme E as Advε,A = | Pr[b = b0] - 12 | The probability is over the
random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
We say that an IBE (or HIBE ID = ID1, ID2, ..., IDk for a level k) system E is (t, qID, ε)-selective-
identity, adaptive plaintext secure if for any IND-sID-CPA adversary A that runs in time t, makes
at most qID chosen private-key queries, we have that Advε,A = | Pr[b = b0] - 12 | < ε.
3.1.6 Selective+-ID Model
In Selective+-ID [14] we give a more power to the adversary. The power is a modification that will
be given in the Challenge phase (prefix of the ID∗).
Challenge : A outputs two equal length messages M0,M1 and an identity v+ where v+ is either
ID∗ or any of its prefixes. In response it receives an encryption of M under v+, where is chosen
uniformly at random from {0, 1}. This model is more general than the sID model, because the
adversary is allowed to ask for a challenge ciphertext not only on ID∗ but also on any of its
prefixes.
A protocol secure in the selective+-ID model is obviously secure in the selective-ID model.
3.1.7 Problem Bilinear of Diffie Hellman Assumption
During all the following section, we use the multiplicative expression instead of the additive one to
simplify the proof of security. So we will give the following definition in the multiplicative expression.
Definition 8 :
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((Decisional) Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem DBDHP). Let G1, G2 two rings with prime order
q. Let
eˆ : G1 ×G2 −→ GT be an application admissible and bilinear and let g be a generator of G1.
The DBDHP in < G1, G2, eˆ > is so : Given < g, g
a, gb, gc, z > for a, b, c ∈ Zq and z ∈ G2. we
say that an algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0,1} has advantage ε in solving the decision BDHP
in G if :
| Pr [ g, ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc ]-Pr [g, ga, gb, gc, z ]| > ε
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g in G1, the random choice of a,
b, c in Zq, the random choice of z ∈ G2, and the random bits of A. The distribution on the
left is refereed as PBDHP and the distribution on the right as RBDHP .
Definition 9 :
((Decisional)k-Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Problem (Dk-BDHIP)). Let k be an integer,
and x ∈ Z∗q , g ∈ G∗2, eˆ : G1 ×G2 −→ GT , T ∈ GT . Can we make the following separation :
| Pr [ g, gx, gx2 , ..., gxk , eˆ(g, g) 1x ]- Pr [g, gx, gx2 , ..., gxk , T ]| > ε
Definition 10 :
((Decisional)k-Weak Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion Problem (Dk − wBDHIP ∗)). Let k be
an integer, and x ∈ Z∗q , g ∈ G∗2, eˆ : G1 × G2 −→ GT , T ∈ GT . Can we make the following
separation :
|Pr [ g, h, gx, gx2 , ..., gxk , eˆ(g, h)x
1
x ]- Pr [g, h, gx, gx
2
, ..., gx
k
, T ]| > ε
3.2 Efficient IBE
Our second goal behind this work is to represent an efficient scheme in the model selective ID. This
notion of security is weaker, Boneh et al prove that to pass from selective ID to full domain we
will introduce a factor N. Additionally, as we have seen previously the BB1 is also more complex.
We propose so to reduce this scheme or rather to propose a scheme in the approach Commutative
Blinding and under the model Selective ID more reduced.
3.2.1 Construction
To avoid the use of two pairing in the Decrypt as with BB1, we collect in our approach the principal
of the inverse in Extract as with BB2[4] and that’s of the commutative Blinding[10], our procedure
is as follow :
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Our Scheme
Setup. Let (G1, GT ) a bilinear group. Choose a generator g ∈ G1
and set Ppub1 = g
l ∈ G1⋆. Calculate e(g, g) = x and e(g, g)a = xa = y.
Mpk= {G1, GT , Ppub1 , x, y }. The Master secret key is Msk= {l,a}
Message space is {0, 1}n, ciphertext space is G1∗ ×{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract : Given an identifer IDA ∈ {0, 1}n of entity A, Mpk and Msk
Pick an rIDA ∈ Zq, returns g
a+IDA
rIDA
l =g
a
rIDA
+r′IDA
IDA
l =g
a′+r′IDA
IDA
l , dA= (rIDA , g
a+IDA
rIDA
l )
Encrypt : Given a m ∈ M , IDA and Mpk, the following step are formed :
1. Pick a random s in Zq
2.Compute zs(IDA+a)=e(g, g)s(IDA+a) = (xIDAy)s
Set the ciphertext to be C = (gls = Ppub1
s,m.zs(IDA+a))
Decrypt : Given a ciphertext C = (u,v)∈C, IDA, dA and Mpk, follow the steps
1. Compute e(ur, dA) and output m=
v
e(u
rIDA ,g
a+IDA
rIDA
l
)
Firstly it is necessary to a fix a security parameter t. l and a follow the degree of security of this
parameter.
Correctness
As we have :
e(urIDA , g
a+IDA
rIDA
l )) = e(glsrIDA , g
a+IDA
rIDA
l )=e(g, g)s(IDA+a), our scheme is then correct
Observation
In our scheme we use the master key (s,a,Pˆ=1sP2), the private key will be dA=(rIDA(a+H1(IDA)))Pˆ .
As a consequence the Pˆ in our scheme will be computed one time and will be reuse to each demands,
contrary to [4]. Noting that the syntax dA1 of a given entity A1, we couldn’t calculate the private
key dA2 for another entity A2, because we don’t know a and we cannot inverse s. Also we change
rIDA for each Identity.
3.2.2 Prove of Security
Before proving the security of our scheme, we note that k−-BDHI, mean that we can use any
k > 0 (it is not linked to the number of users as with[4]). And it is of our choice (we can choose it
2 or any number), by contrast with [4] we need at lest 250 (after [7]) for a 80 level of security.
The security of our scheme is basing on Dk−-BDHI assumption since :
Theorem : Suppose the (t, k−, ε)-Decision BDHI assumption holds in G of size |G| = p. Then our
scheme is (t′, qS , ε)-selective identity, chosen plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure, with an advantage :
advscheme(t’) > advDk
−−DBDHIP (t-O(τ q)) for any qS < q . Where τ is the time needed for an
exponentiation in the following study.
Proof. Suppose A has advantage ε in attacking our scheme. We build an algorithm B that uses A
to solve the Decision k−-BDHI problem in G. Algorithm B is given as input a random (k−+2)-tuple
(g, gα, gα
2
, ..gα
k−
, T ) ∈ Gk−+11 ×GT that is either sampled from PBDHI (where T = e(g, g)1/α) or
from RBDHI (where T is uniform and independent in GT ). The goal of the algorithm B is to output
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1 if T = e(g, g)1/α and 0 otherwise. Algorithm B works by interacting with A in a selective identity
game as follows :
Setup.
To generate the system parameters, algorithm B does the following :
In the beginning algorithm A give B the identity I∗=a1b1 that it intends to attack. The selective
identity game begins, but algorithm B need to prepare to it the following step :
Preparation step
In the preparation step algorithm B choose an arbitrary x he compute b1x
After he compute (implicitly) : f(α) =
∑
i=1
k−ciα
i
He choose an arbitrary r0 then he compute (implicitly) r1 = r0
∑
i=1
k−ciα
i−1
In the end he compute h=gf(α) and he publish this h
Phase 1 :
A issues at most qS private key queries, with qS < q. Consider the i-th query for the private
key corresponding to public key IDi 6= ID∗.
We need to respond with a private key (r, h
a+r(I−I∗)
α )
The I represent a general identity ID and I∗ represent an identity to be attacked
r is uniformly distributed in Zp.
Algorithm B responds to the query as follows :
Firstly it is possible that the private key in our scheme may has the syntax dA=g
a+IDA
l instead
of dA=g
a+IDA
rl =g
a
rl + r
′IDA
l =g
a′+r′IDA
l . But we need this latter to simplify the proof
B pose R= xr0 + r1 he can calculate implicitly
R = f(α)f(α) (
x
r0
+ r1I−I∗ I − I∗)
= f(α)
α
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1
( xr0 +
r1
I−I∗ (I − I∗))
= f(α)α (
x
r0
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1
+ r1∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1(I−I∗)
(I − I∗))
= f(α)α (
x
r0
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1
+
r0
∑
i=1
k−ciα
i−1
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1(I−I∗)
(I − I∗))
= f(α)α (
x
r0
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1
+ r0I−I∗ (I − I∗))
= f(α)α (a
′ + r′(I − I∗))
With r’= r0I−I∗ which is easy to calculate by B
But a’= x
r0
∑
i=1
k−ciαi−1
is not it is a Master key for B like α.
NB : (For the master key a, A can publish ga in system of parameters. To remove this a,
B search for an σ such that : gagσ = gα)
So B can calculate easily gR as he know g
x
r0 and gr0
But gR = g
f(α)
α
(a′+r′(I−I∗))=h
a′+r′(I−I∗)
α which is a valid private key and so B can give A the
private key (r’,h
a′+r′(I−I∗)
α )
More B has not the advantage to calculate the private key for I∗
Challenge.
A outputs two messagesM0,M1 ∈ G1. Algorithm B picks a random bit b ∈ {0,1} and a random
l’ ∈ Zp∗. It responds with the ciphertext prepared as follow :
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He have hs = h
s
α
.α = hl
′α = c1, with l’=
s
α
And c2=MT
s(xb1+a1
b1
)
h = T
s(x+I∗)
h (or rather c2=MT
s(ab1+a1
b1
)
h = T
s(a+I∗)
h )
So if Th = e(h, h)
1
α he will have e(h, h)
s
α
(x+I∗) = c2 = e(h, h)
l′(x+I∗)
And he combine CT=(c1, c2) = (h
l′α, e(h, h)l
′(x+I∗)) which is a valid ciphertext under ID∗
If Th is uniform in G1, then CT is independent of the bit b.
Phase 2.
A issues more private key queries, for a total of at most qS < q. Algorithm B responds as
before.
Guess.
Finally, A outputs a guess b’ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b’ then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g) 1α .
Otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning T 6= e(g, g) 1α .
When the input k− +2-tuple is sampled from PBDHIP (where T = e(g, g)
1
α ) then As view is iden-
tical to its view in a real attack game and therefore A must satisfy |Pr[b = b′] - 1/2| > ε. On the
other hand, when the input k−+2-tuple is sampled from RBDHIP (where T is uniform in GT ) then
Pr[b = b′] = 1/2. Therefore, with g uniform in G1, T uniform in GT we have that :∣∣∣ Pr [ g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαk− , eˆ(g, g) 1α ]- Pr [g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαk− , T ]
∣∣∣≥ ∣∣ (12 ± ε)− 12=ε ∣∣ . ✷
Noting that in IBE, s+-ID and s-ID are the same, the difference may be in HIBE.
3.2.3 Discussion
◮ Comparison with BB1 and BB2
In the following we compare the efficiency of our scheme with BB1 (version IBE[11] but under
selective ID) and with BB2. We have seen above that we make a little change in BB2. This change
is effective as we reduce the complexity of BB2. More than that our scheme is also more efficient
than BB1(version IBE[11]). All this statements are summarized in table 6.
 Compute of complexity
With the fact that :
For example Expffi∗/∗∗ : Exponentiation in the finite field involved in */**, the * is the base of
exponentiation, until the ** base of the exponent ; Pair : Pairing ; Inv : Inverse ; Mul : Multiplication.
As we have : ComplexityBB1 −ComplexityOur =
(3Pair+1DivffiGT /GT
+ 3MulffiG1/G1 + 7ExpffiG1/Zq + 2ExpffiGT /Zq
) -
(2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT
+2MulffiZq/Zq+1MulffiGT /GT
+3ExpffiG1/Zq+3ExpffiGT /Zq
+1InvffiZq/Zq )
=
1Pair+4ExpffiG1/Zq+3MulffiG1/G1 -1InvffiZq/Zq−2MulffiZq/Zq−1MulffiGT /GT -1ExpffiGT /Zq >>
0
And we have : ComplexityBB2 − ComplexityOur =
(2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT
+2MulffiG1/G1+1ExpffiGT /Zq+7ExpffiG1/Zq+1InvffiZq/Zq+2MulffiG1/Zq )-
(2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT
+2MulffiZq/Zq+1MulffiGT /GT
+3ExpffiG1/Zq+3ExpffiGT /Zq
+1InvffiZq/Zq )
=
4ExpffiG1/Zq + 1MulffiG1/G1 + 2MulffiG1/Zq − 2MulffiZq/Zq -2ExpffiGT /Zq >> 0
Our scheme is then efficient than BB1 and BB2. Noting that in our scheme and BB2, we have
taking into consideration the use of r which we need it only in the proof. The 1s is calculate one
time and we ruse its calculate for each demand.
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Table 6 –
BB1
Params 2ExpffiG1/Zq+1Pair+1ExpffiGT /Zq
Extract 2MulffiZq/Zq + 2ExpffiG1/Zq
Encrypt 1MulffiZq/Zq+3ExpG1/Zq+1ExpffiGT/Zq
Decrypt 2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT
Sum 3Pair+1DivffiGT /GT + 3MulffiG1/G1 + 7ExpffiG1/Zq + 2ExpffiGT /Zq
BB2
Params 2ExpffiG1/Zq+1Pair
Extract 1MulffiZq/Zq + 1InvffiZq/Zq + 1ExpffiG1/Zq
Encrypt 1MulffiZq/Zq+3ExpffiG1/Zq+1ExpffiGT /Zq+1MulffiG1/G1
Decrypt 1Pair+1DivffiGT /GT + 1MulffiG1/G1 + 1ExpffiG1/Zq
Sum 2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT + 2MulffiG1/G1 + 7ExpffiG1/Zq+1InvffiZq/Zq + 2MulffiG1/Zq
Our
Params 1ExpffiG1/Zq+1Pair+1ExpffiGT /Zq
Extract 1ExpffiG1/Zq+2MulffiZq/Zq+1InvffiZq/Zq
Encrypt 1MulffiGT /GT +2ExpffiGT/Zq +1ExpG1/Zq
Decrypt 1Pair+1DivffiGT /GT +1ExpffiG1/Zq
Sum 2Pair+1DivffiGT /GT + 2MulffiZq/Zq + 1MulffiGT /GT + 3ExpffiG1/Zq+3ExpffiGT /Zq+1InvffiZq/Zq
 Concrete Comparison : Technique of Boyen
Using the technique (or rather the base) of Boyen [11], we obtain so the following result. But,
to balance the comparison between the scheme, we consider that BB1 functions with symmetric
pairing as our scheme and BB2.
SS @ 80-bit security level
BB1 BB2 Our
Extract : 4 2 2
Encrypt : 108 108 106
Decrypt : 320 222 222
Sum 432 332 330
MNT @ 80-bit security level
BB1 BB2 Our
Extract : 0,4 0,2 0,2
Encrypt : 100 ,8 100,8 100,6
Decrypt : 320 220,2 220,2
Sum 421,2 321,2 321
SS : Curve Supersingular
MNT : Curve MNT
So according to these result, our scheme is more efficient than BB1. It’s complexity is nearest to
BB2, but we will confirms that our scheme is efficient than BB2. As this latter is basing in its study
of simulation in Dk-BDHIP, with k is linked to the request identity. By contrast, our scheme is
basing in Dk−-BDHIP, k− << k. So our scheme is more efficient than BB2 according to the result
od Cheon[20].
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3.3 Efficient HIBE
3.3.1 Our Construction
As we have cited above, Boneh ,Boyen and Goh [17] have proposed an efficient scheme. This scheme
reduce the ciphertext of an HIBE from k parameters to a shorten one of only three parameters. And
the Decrypt from k product of pairing, to only two pairing. But [17] necessitate that the use of the
identity to be chosen will be taken in Z∗q which limit the selection of the identity, more than that
[17] doesn’t support the selective+ID. In the following proposition we overcome all this weakness.
Our Scheme
Setup. Let (G1, GT ) a bilinear group. Choose a generator g ∈ G1
and set Ppub1 = g
l ∈ G1⋆. Calculate e(g, g) = x and
e(g, g)a1 = xa1 = y1, e(g, g)
a2 = xa2 = y2,...,e(g, g)
av = xav = yv.
(or rather ga1 , ga2 ,...,gav ).
Mpk= {G1, GT , Ppub1 , x, y1, ga1 , y2, ga2 ..., yv , gav }, Msk= {l,ai / 1 ≤ i ≤ v }
Message space is {0, 1}n, ciphertext space is G1∗ ×{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n.
Extract : Given an identifer IDA = (IA1 , ..., IAj ) ∈ Zpj of depth j ≤ v,
of an entity A, public key Mpk, master key Msk returns
For a depth j, we have dA=g
a1+IA1
+a2+IA2
+...+aj+IAj
l
The private key is (g
a1+IA1
+a2+IA2
+...+aj+IAj
l , g
1
l , g
aj+1
l , ..., g
av
l )
(or (e(g, g)
a1+IA1
+a2+IA2
+...+aj+IAj
l , e(g, g)
1
l , e(g, g)
aj+1
l , ..., , e(g, g)
av
l ))
Noting that for level j+1, choose sj+1 ∈ Zp and calculate
(g
a1+IA1
+a2+IA2
+...+aj+IAj
+sj+1(aj+1)+IAj+1
l , g
1
l , g
aj+2
l , ..., g
av
l )
Encrypt : Given m ∈ M , IDA and Mpk, the following step are formed :
1. pick a random s in Zq
2.Compute z
s(IA1+a1+IA2+a2+...+aj+IAj )=
= e(g, g)
s(IA1+a1+IA2+a2+...+IAj+aj) = (x
IA1+IA2+...+IAj y1y2...yj)
s
Ciphertext is C = (gls = Ppub1
s, gs,m.z
s(IA1+a1+IA2+a2+...+IAj ))
Decrypt : Given C = (u’, u”,v’)∈C, IDA, dA, Mpk, follow the step
1. Compute e(u′, dA) and output m=
v′e(u′′,g(sj−1)aj )
e(u′,dA)
Observation
⋆ The private key (g
a1+IA1
+a2+IA2
+...+sj(aj)+IAj
l , g
1
l , g
aj+1
l , ..., g
av
l ) = (d0, d1, ...dv−1) is a private
key for the Entity in Hierarchy (Children). For the user the private key will be (d0, g
(sj−1)aj ),
if we are in a level j.
⋆ l and aj , j ∈ {1,...,v } follow a certain level of security. What is mean that they are belonging
in 2t for a parameter t of security chosen in beginning (following for example the requirement
of NIST)
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3.3.2 Prove of Security
The security of our scheme is basing on Dl −BDHIWC (which mean Dl-BDHI With Condition,
in the following the condition is gα
l
= 1) assumption since :
Theorem : Suppose the (t,l,ε)-Decision BDHIwc assumption holds in G. Then our scheme is
(t′, qS ,ε
′)-selective identity, chosen plaintext (IND-sID-CPA) secure such that :
Advscheme(t′, qS ,ε
′) ≥ Advl−DBDHIWC (t,l,ε) where t’ > t-O(lq τ). Where τ is the time needed to
make an exponentiation in the following proof :
Proof. Suppose A has advantage in attacking our scheme. We build an algorithm B that uses A
to solve the Decision l −BDHIWC problem in G. Algorithm B is given as input a random
(l+3)-tuple (g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l−1
, l, T ) ∈ G∗1l×Zq ×GT such that gα
l
=1, this input is either sampled
from PBDHI (where T = e(g, g)
1
α ) or from RBDHI (where T is uniform and independent in GT ).
The goal of the algorithm B is to output 1 if T = e(g, g)
1
α ) and 0 otherwise. Algorithm B works
by interacting with A in a selective identity game as follows :
Initialization.
We note for the selective identity ID∗ = (I1
∗, ..., Ik
∗) ∈ (Zp)k which algorithm A intends to
attack. If k < v, B concatenate by 1 to have exactly v (the depth of the hierarchy).
Setup.
As algorithm A can give to B the (g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
l
, l / gα
l
= 1) according to its choice. So
depending on the identity ID∗ = (I1
∗, ..., Ik
∗) chosen. A choose an an arbitrary j from [1,k],
for example j=2. He calculate (g−I
∗
2 , g−I
∗
2α, g−I
∗
2α
2
, ..., g−I
∗
2α
l
, l / gα
l
= 1). Implicitly he
calculate : f(α) =
∑
i=0
sαi, t(α) = f(α)− f(0), also t(α)α = f(α)−f(0)α = f ′(α). s will be chosen
according to some requirement in phase 1.
Our goal is to test if B can output the private key
dA = (h
a1+a2+...+ak
α
+
I1−I
∗
1+I2−I
∗
2+...+Ik−I
∗
k
α , h
1
α , h
ak+1
α , h
ak+2
α , ..., h
av
α )=(d0, d1, d3, ..., dv−2) for a
given v and an identity (I1, ..., Iv)
B first picks a random γ1, γ1, ..., γv ∈ Zp∗ which will verify some conditions in phase 1
Phase 1.
A issues up to qS private key queries.
In the first step, choose an identity ID=(I1, ..., Ir), such that r ≤ v
If r ≤ k, he selections only r element from ID∗ and if r ≥ k the adversary B concatenate k
(the depth of I∗) by 1 as we have seen above.
To response to d0, B can make the following step :
B imagine (implicitly) that each ai (1 ≤ i ≤ v) can be writ as ai=γi + (−1)iαi (*)
Noting that B can make this, as he can choose a suitable γi such that g
αi = gaigγi . We
privilege to use the syntax (*), because f(α)gα
i
can be not calculate-see the following
So f(α)−f(0)α
∑i=k
i=1 ai =
f(α)−f(0)
α
∑i=k
i=1(γi + (−1)iαi) = f ′(α)
∑i=k
i=1 γi.f
′(α)
∑i=k
i=1(−1)iαi
The first part f ′(α)
∑i=k
i=1 γi can be calculate easily (after exponent it by g), until the second
may not. But if we regroup it, we can find that f ′(α)
∑i=k
i=1(−1)iαi =∑i=s
i=1 α
i−1(−α+ α2 − α3 + ...αk−1 + αk)
=−∑i=si=1 αi +∑i=si=1 αi+1 −∑i=si=1 αi+2 + ...+ (−1)k−1∑i=si=1 αi+k−2 + (−1)k∑i=si=1 αi+k−1.
To remove the overstepping α, B must choose its s such that s+k-1=l i.e s=l-k-1 which imply
that the most long factor : αi+s−1 is equal to 1. Thus B can calculate easily
g
f(α)−f(0)
α
(−I∗2 )
∑i=k
i=1 ai = h
∑i=k
i=1 ai
α , (with h=g(f(α)−f(0))(−I
∗
2 ) = gf
′′(α)(−I∗2 )) which is equal to
g(f
′(α)
∑i=k
i=1 γi)(−
∑i=s
i=1 α
i+
∑i=s
i=1 α
i+1−
∑i=s
i=1 α
i+2+...+(−1)k−1
∑i=s
i=1 α
i+k−2+(−1)k
∑i=s
i=1 α
i+k−1)(−I∗2 ) =
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g(f
′(α)
∑i=k
i=1 γi)(−α−α
3−...(−1)kαs+k−1)(−I∗2 ).
For the second part : R = h
I1−I
∗
1+I2−I
∗
2+...+Ik−I
∗
k
α . To output the exact key of ID at which all
elements of ID operate in d0, all the Ii chosen will be different from I
∗
2 . And to benefit from
f ′′(α), all Ii (for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r) of the requested identity ID, will be such that : Ii 6= nI∗2 from
each to other and this for n ∈ N. Because he wouldn’t obtain f ′′(α), but he may obtain
another f ′′′(α).
Observation
A can choose (g−I
∗
k , g−I
∗
2α
2
, g−I
∗
4α
4
, ..., g−I
∗
k−1α
k−1
, l / gα
l
= 1)instead of (g−I
∗
2 ,
g−I
∗
2α, g−I
∗
2α
2
, ..., g−I
∗
2α
l
, l / gα
l
= 1) ( we treat this later i.e only with I∗2 to simplify the
proof). So if B make a research exhaustive to know the exact place of I∗i for 1 ≤ i ≤ v, he
need at most doing v research, which cost (v !), as v can be great. So for all 1 ≤ i ≤ v the
Ii 6= nI∗2 ∀ n ∈ N. And this is an ideal case.
To calculate R, B will calculate firstly d1. And to do it, B can calculate
f(α)−f(0)
α = f
′(α).
After he calculate g
f(α)−f(0)
−α
(−I∗2 ) = g
f ′′(α)(−I∗2 )
α = gf
′(α)(−I∗2 ) = h
1
α = d1. With this, B can
calculate easily R, as he exponents only with I1 − I∗1 + I2 − I∗2 + ...+ Ik − I∗k .
Now to calculate d3, d4..., dv−2, we have respectively the coefficients α,α
2, α3, ..., αs+v−1 after
a product of ak+1...,av with f
′(α). Effectively, all j overstepping l i.e l=j-x their αj = αx,
with x<l ✷
Thus with this manner B can responds to the private key
dA = (h
a1+a2+...+ak
α
+
I1−I
∗
1+I2−I
∗
2+...+Ik−I
∗
k
α , h
1
α , h
ak+1
α , h
ak+2
α , ..., h
av
α )
Challenge.
A outputs two messages M0,M1 ∈ G1. Algorithm B picks a random bit b ∈ {0,1} and a
random l’ ∈ Zp∗. It responds with the ciphertext prepared as follow :
He have g(f(α)−f(0))(−I2
∗)s = h
s
α
.α = hl
′α = c1, with l’=
s
α
And c2=MT
s(a1+a2+...+ak+I
∗
1+I
∗
2+...+I
∗
k)
h = T
s(a1+a2+...+ak+I
∗
1+I
∗
2+...+I
∗
k)
h
So if Th = e(h, h)
1
α he will have
e(h, h)
s
α
(a1+a2+...+ak+I
∗
1+I
∗
2+...+I
∗
k) = c2 = e(h, h)
l′(a1+a2+...+ak+I
∗
1+I
∗
2+...+I
∗
k)
And he combine CT=(c1, c2) = (h
l′α, e(h, h)l
′(a1+a2+...+ak+I
∗
1+I
∗
2+...+I
∗
k)) which is a valid
ciphertext under ID∗
If Th is uniform in G1, then CT is independent of the bit b.
Phase 2.
A issues more private key queries, for a total of at most qS < q. Algorithm B responds as
before.
Guess.
Finally, A outputs a guess b’ ∈ {0, 1}. If b = b’ then B outputs 1 meaning T = e(g, g) 1α .
Otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning T 6= e(g, g) 1α .
When the input l + 2-tuple is sampled from PBDHIP (where T = e(g, g)
1
α ) then As view is
identical to its view in a real attack game and therefore A must satisfy |Pr[b = b′] - 1/2| > ε. On
the other hand, when the input l + 2-tuple is sampled from RBDHIP (where T is uniform in GT )
then Pr[b = b′] = 1/2. Therefore, with g uniform in G1, T uniform in GT we have that :∣∣∣ Pr [ g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαl−1 , l, eˆ(g, g) 1α ]- Pr [g, gα, gα2 , ..., gαl , l, T ] ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ (12 ± ε)− 12=ε ∣∣ .
✷
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3.3.3 Discussion
Our first discussion will be about the problem used in the proof, which is Dl−BDHIWC . We
have considers in the above that : l >> v (v is the depth of the hierarchy). But, this can make our
proposition vulnerable to the cryptanalysis of Cheon [20] by comparison with Dl − wBDHI∗ in
[17]. As in this latter, l ≤ v (v the depth of the hierarchy), since in the [20] cheon prove that the
strong Diffie-Hellman problem has a complexity reduction O(
√
l) by comparison with PDL. So
while k is great, while it will be easy to be cryptanalysis. To avoid this, we propose to consider
l=v+l’, we can use so αl
′
= β instead of α to reduce the problem from Dl−BDHIWC to
Dv −BDHIWC and even we can make less of this.
We note that the relationship between the problem used is :
l −BHIP −→1 l − wBDHI∗ −→2 l −BDHIWC (so :
Dl−BHIP −→1 Dl−wBDHI∗ −→2 Dl−BDHIWC). The relation 1 was proven in [17], until 2
is easy to be proven.
Even if [17], is basing on a strong problem of Diffie Hellman compared to our (this may be linked
to the use of asymmetric pairing). But [17] has two weakness, which are the obliged use of the
selection identity in the study of simulation in Z∗p instead of Zp as with our. This limit the
selection of the identity to be challenged, since we couldn’t use any were the bit 0. More than that
the [17] does not support s+ID − CPA, by contrast our scheme is like BB1 support this notion.
According to [14] to render [17] s+ID − CPA, the authors make a simple modification. Its proof
yields a multiplicative security degradation by a factor of v, where v is the maximum number of
levels in the HIBE. And to not obtain this degradation the authors add v-k factors or rather
(v − k)ExpG1 in the original scheme (v is the maximum depth of the Hierarchies, until k is the
depth of the identity selected ID∗)
By contrast with our scheme we don’t need this, because our scheme is s+ID − CPA and it offer
a competitive to [17]
To see this we count in the following the complexity of BB1, BBG, and our scheme :
Extractuser level k Encrypt Decrypt
BB1 (2k + 3)ExpG1 (2k + 1)ExpG1 + 1ExpGT (k + 1)pairing + kMulGT
BBG 3ExpG1 (k + 2)ExpG1 + 1ExpGT 2pairing
Our 2ExpG1 or 2ExpGT (k + 2)ExpGT + 2ExpG1 2 pairing+1MulGT+1ExpG1
In this table we wouldn’t take into account some complexity (like division of pairing, multiplicity
by y1y2...yk in our scheme, multiplicity by g3 in BBG...)
According to this table our scheme is more efficient by comparison with BB1 and with even BBG.
Because, ExpGT which we count it as ExpZpk′
(in the finite field) is small than ExpG1 (i.e in
curve elliptic).
This efficient is visible in Extract, and Encrypt (for the two scheme BB1 and BBG). For the
Decrypt we have a little overstepping by comparison with BBG, but because of what we seen in
the highest (in the point of view security), our scheme is so more efficient.
3.4 Application
3.4.1 Overview on Forward Encryption
In [13] Canetti et al propose a forward-secure encryption scheme in the standard model basing on
[16]. The (fs-HIBE) scheme allows each user in the hierarchy to refresh his or her private keys
periodically while keeping the public key the same. Using this, so even if there are any were a
compromise of long-term keys it does not permit the compromise of the past session keys and
therefore past communications. Since exposure of a secret key corresponding to a given interval
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does not enable an adversary to break the system for any prior time period. For more detail, we
send the interested to [13][33].
To admit a succeed Forward Security, the following requirements will be realizing :
- New users would be able to join the hierarchy and receive secret keys from their parent
nodes at any time.
- The encryption does not require knowledge of when a user or any of his ancestors joined
the hierarchy, we call this joining-time-oblivious. So the sender can encrypt the message as
long as he knows the current time and the ID-tuple of the receiver, along with the public
parameters of the system.
- The scheme should be forward-secure.
- Refreshing secret keys can be carried out autonomously, that is, users can refresh their
secret keys on their own to avoid any communication overhead with any PKG.
Eventually jointing [13] and [16] can give a scheme which can not verify these requirements. For
more detail see [33]. To over come this the authors in [33], have proposed a scheme (basing in [13])
which conserve all these requirements, but they use only HIBE of [16], which give a heavy scheme.
In the following we give a version at which we use our syntax of an HIBE (we declared it only).
This reduce the complexity, but because of some circumstance, we wouldn’t give in this article it’s
proof of security. We let it, in the future work and to the interested.
Implementation : Declaration
Firstly we note skw,(ID1,...,IDv) : a node key associated with some prefix w of he bit representation
of a time period i and a tuple (ID1, ..., IDv).
SKi,(ID1,...,IDv) : Key associated with time i and an ID-tuple (ID1, ..., IDv). It consists of sk keys
as follows : SKi,(ID1,...,IDv) = {ski,(ID1,...,IDv), skw1,(ID1,...,IDv) : w0 is a prefix of i}. With W0 and
W1 represent respectively node right and node left.
Setup(1k, N = 2l)
The root PKG with ID1 does the following :
1. IG is run to generate groups G1, GT of order q and bilinear map eˆ.
2. A random generator g of G1 is selected
3. Ppub1 = g
l ∈ G1⋆.
4. Calculate e(g, g) = x, e(g, g)a1 = xa1 = y1, e(g, g)
a2 = xa2 = y2,...,e(g, g)
av = xav = yv.
(or rather ga1 , ga2 ,...,gav ).
Mpk= {G1, GT , Ppub1 , x, y1, ga1 , y2, ga2 ..., yv , gav }, Msk= {l,ai / 1 ≤ i ≤ v }
The following algorithm is a helper method, it is called by the Setup and Upd algorithms.
CompNext(skw,h, w, (ID1...IDv))
It takes a secret key skw,v, a node w, and an ID-tuple, and outputs keys sk(w0),v, sk(w1),v for
time nodes w0 and w1 of (ID1...IDv).
1. Parse w as w1...wd, where |w| = d. Parse ID-tuple as ID1, ..., IDv . Parse skw,h
associated with time node w, for all 1≤ k ≤ d and 1 ≤ j ≤ v.
2. Choose random s(d+1),j ∈ Zq for all 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
3. Set S(w0),v =
(g
ad+1,1+w0◦IA1
+ad+1,2+w0◦IA2
+...+ad+1,j−1+w0◦IAj−1
+sd+1,j(ad+1,j)+w0◦IAj
l , g
1
l , g
ad+1,j+1
l , ..., g
ad+1,v
l )
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S(w1),h =
(g
ad+1,1+w1◦IA1
+ad+1,2+w1◦IA2
+...+ad+1,j−1+w1◦IAj−1
+sd+1,j(ad+1,j)+w1◦IAj
l , g
1
l , g
ad+1,j+1
l , ..., g
ad+1,v
l )
4. Erase s(d+1),j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v.
KeyDer(SKi,(v−1), i, (ID1...IDv))
Let Eh be an entity that joins the hierarchy during the time period i < N - 1 with ID-tuple
(ID1, ..., IDv).E
′
hs parent generates E
′
vs key SKi,v using its key SKi,(v−1) as follows :
1. Parse i as i1...il where l = log2N . Parse SKi,(n−1) as (ski,(v−1), { sk(i|k−11),(v−1)]ik }=0).
2. For each value skw,(v−1) in SKi,(v−1), E
′
vs parent does the following to generate E
′
hs key
skw,v : (a) Parse w as w1...wd, where d ≤ l, and parse the secret key skw,(v−1) as
(Sw,(v−1), , g
1
l , g
aw,v
l )).
(b) Choose random sk,v ∈ Zq for all 1 ≤ k ≤ d. Recall that sk,j is a shorthand for
sw|k ,(ID1...IDj) associated with time node w|k and tuple (ID1...IDj).
(c) Set the child entity Ev’s secret point Sw,v
=g
a1,1+w|k◦IA1
+a2,2+w|k◦IA2
+...+aj−1,j−1+w|k◦IAj−1
+sd+1,j(aj,j)+w|k◦IAj
l .
E′hs parent sets SKi,h = (ski,h, {sk(i|k−11),h}ik=0), and erases all other information.
Upd(SKi,h, i+ 1, (ID1...IDv)) (where i < N -1)
At the end of time i, an entity (PKG or individual) with ID-tuple (ID1, ..., IDv) does the
following to compute its private key for time i + 1, as in the fs-PKE scheme [].
1. Parse i as i1...il, where |i| = l. Parse SKi,v as (sk(i|l),v, {sk(i|k−11),v}ik = 0). Erase ski|l,h.
2. We distinguish two cases. If il = 0, simply output the remaining keys as the key
SK(i+1),v for the next period for ID-tuple (ID1, ..., IDh). Otherwise, let k˜ be the largest
value such that i
k˜
= 0 (such k˜ must exist since i < N - 1). Let i’ = i|
k˜−1
1. Using ski′,h
(which is included as part of SKi,v), recursively apply algorithmCompNext to generate
keys sk(i′0d1),v for all
0 ≤ d ≤ l − k˜ − 1, and sk
(i′0d−k˜,v)
. The key sk
(i′0d−k˜ ,v)
will be used for decryption in the
next time period i+1, the rest of sk keys are for computing future keys. Erase ski′,v and
output the remaining keys as SK(i+1),v .
Enc(i, (ID1, ..., IDv),M) (where M ∈ {0, 1}n)
1. Parse i as i1...il
2. Denote Pk,j = H1(i|k ◦ ID1...IDj) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ h.
3. pick a random s in Zq
4. Compute
z
s(a|2,1+i|2◦ID1+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+a|1,1+i|1◦ID1+...+a|1,j+i|1◦ID1...IDj+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+...+a|j,j+i|j◦ID1...IDj)=
e(g, g)
s(a|2 ,1+i|2◦ID1+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+a|1,1+i|1◦ID1+...+a|1,j+i|1◦ID1...IDj+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+...+a|j,j+i|j◦ID1...IDj)
Ciphertext is C=(gls = Ppub1
s, gs,
m.z
s(a|2,1+i|2◦ID1+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+a|1,1+i|1◦ID1+...+a|1,j+i|1◦ID1...IDj+...+a|j,1+i|j◦ID1+...+a|j,j+i|j◦ID1...IDj))
Decrypt : Given C = (u’,u”,v’)∈C, IDA, dA, Mpk, follow the step
1. Parse i as i1...il. Parse SKi,h associated with the ID-tuple as (ski,h, {sk(i|k−11),h}ik=0).
2. Compute e(u′, dA) and output m=
v′e(gs,g
sja|j,1
+...+a|j,j )
e(u′,dA)
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Comparison
To see the efficiency of our scheme (and BBG) in forward scheme we make the following
comparison.
fs-HIBE [33] fs-with our
Key derivation time O(v log N) O((v-k) logN)
Encryption time O(v log N) O(v log N)
Decryption time O(v log N) O(k+log N)
Key update time O(v) O(v-k)
Ciphertext length O(v log N) O(3 log N)
Public key size O(v + log N) O(v + log N)
Secret key size O(v log N) O((v-k) log N)
k is the hierarchy children considered.
N is the total number of the time periods.
v is depth of the hierarchy.
3.5 Construction of CCA2
This section is reserved to signal the technique to be used to obtain a CCA2 from CPA.
To render CPA a CCA2, there are some techniques :
For an IBE or HIBE with random oracle we can use the two method given by Fujusiki Okamoto
[34]
For an IBE or HIBE without random oracle, there are also two techniques :
That’s of [13] at which we use one-time signature.
That’s of [35] at which we add a MAC.
So using one of these last technique can render our scheme CCA2 secure.
4 Conclusion
In these papers, we have study the competition between the best-known cryptosystems of the
cryptography IBE. Our approach is more accurate than the only method made in this direction of
Boyen. Even if we follow a very simple strategy but it is so effective to clarify the cryptosystems
that deserve a standardized participation. We concluded that the pattern of Boneh and Franklin
in the field of RO, is the most effective, but we recommend using one of Skai Kasarah since Boneh
and Franklin projects into an elliptic curve which limit the selection of curve, it may so pose a
problems of security. And we note that unlike the results of Boyen the BB1 is late compared to
others. In general we can say that the scheme of Water is the most preferable as it is traced in the
domain of SM, more it has an important classification. Following the criteria considered SK and
BF are the most helpful.
This study is very useful to cryptographers, because we surveying the very recents recherches in
IBE. More we shows the weakness and strength of every cryptosystem in competition, which can
facilitate to make an improvement to admit a more practical cryptosystems.
More than that, we have presented two efficient schemes in the model selective ID and without
random oracle (which is our second contribution behind this work). With a little change in the
schemes of Boneh and Boyen we get a more efficient schemes. The change is make in BB2 (change
1
s+ID by
1
s ), which permit to eliminate the use of two pairing in the Decrypt of IBE and, more the
resulting scheme is traced in the approach of commutative Blinding. Effectively as it is presented
in this article, the complexity of our scheme is less than that of BB1 (version IBE) and even than
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that of BB2. More than that, we have based our prove of security in Dk−-BDHIP which is an
efficient problem than Dk-BDHIP used by BB2, since with this latter, k is linked essentially to
the numbers of identity to be challenged. By contrast, with our we are not, any k− can serve us,
we can take as title of example k−=2, which make Dk−-BDHIP in competition with DBDHP
(D1-BDHIP) used by BB1. In other part, using our syntax of IBE in HIBE and using the
technique of BBG (Boneh Boyen Goh) we get a more efficient HIBE than BB1 and BBG. The
efficiency by comparison with BB1, is clearly seen in complexity. With our proposition, the
technique of BBG will be more efficient. Because, with our proposition the complexity will be
reduced. More than that, our HIBE support s+-ID (which require a degradation by v in the
studies of simulations) and we can not demand that the identity to be challenged will be in Z∗q as
with BBG. This render BBG more restricted, as we are are not free to choose the identity to be
challenged. Using our proposition in some applications like Forward Encryption make them more
efficient.
Thus, during all these papers, we have presented an efficient IBE and HIBE without random
oracle. With a little change in BB2 we obtain an efficient schemes than BB1 and BB2, which are
considered until 2011 (Journal of Cryptology) as the most efficient schemes in the model selective
ID and without random oracle.
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